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THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND TOO-BIG-TOFAIL: WHAT’S MISSING?
A SURVEY OF THE CURRENT LITERATURE
DALE B. THOMPSON *
DEPT. OF ETHICS & BUSINESS LAW
OPUS COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS
JANUARY 31, 2014
ABSTRACT
Many have suggested that the de facto governmental policy of “too big
to fail” is one of the causes of the severity of the 2008 Financial Crisis in
the United States. One of the express purposes of the Dodd-Frank financial
market reform legislation of 2010 was “to end ‘too big to fail.’” The DoddFrank Act attempts to address “too big to fail” by expanding the regulatory
reach to non-bank systemically-important institutions, by creating an
“orderly liquidation authority,” and by limiting the authority of regulatory
bodies that give loans to failing banks.
However, the Act is incomplete. Even with these instruments,
economic conditions continue to exist where large banks receive discounted
rates for their funds, because market participants continue to perceive their
loans and equity as less risky because they remain “too big to fail.”
Additionally, Dodd-Frank’s enhanced prudential standards rely heavily on
stronger capital requirements, and large banks can devise strategies that
comply with these requirements despite the risk. To find out what is
missing from Dodd-Frank, this article surveys the existing literature to
discover a number of alternative approaches to ending “too big to fail.”

* Associate Professor, Opus College of Business, University of St. Thomas; J.D. Stanford Law
School, Ph.D. Stanford University (Economics), B.A. Williams College (Economics). The author
would like to thank participants at the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy
Symposium, “Regulating the Free Market,” for their helpful comments and suggestions. This
research has also been supported by a grant from the Opus College of Business, University of St.
Thomas.

53

54

UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. X

INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Financial Crisis caused significant economic damage to the
United States.1 In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (Dodd-Frank) in order to prevent
another crisis. In part of Dodd-Frank, Congress tries to end the de facto
policy of “too big to fail” (TBTF), which was seen by many as a key cause
of the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Ever since the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
crisis3 in 1984, the U.S. federal government was seen to be willing to step in
to support a bank or other financial institution that was close to failing if
that institution was systemically important. In the 2008 Financial Crisis, we
saw the TBTF policy play out. While the Administration did allow Lehman
Brothers to fail, the U.S. government did step in directly to support a
number of “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs). The
Federal Reserve helped support JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear
Stearns. It also “approv[ed] Goldman Sachs’ and Morgan Stanley’s
applications to become bank holding companies eligible for discount
window borrowing.”4 The government also took extraordinary steps to
ensure Merrill Lynch’s survival when it “threatened to fire Bank of
America’s management and board if the company attempted to terminate
the deal”5 to merge Merrill Lynch into Bank of America. Additionally, the
government provided directly $125 billion in capital to support Citigroup,
Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Goldman
Sachs, and others.6
In Dodd-Frank, Congress took a number of steps to end the TBTF

1. For reviews, see for example, VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET:
THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2010); FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. ANDREW
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AND THEMSELVES (2009).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
3. Continental Illinois was in danger of failing, and its failure would have had significant
impacts on the thousands of other banks that had funds invested with it. Consequently, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) stepped in and “rescued” the bank. See FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 80S: VOL. I, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISIS OF
THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S (1997); See also CHAPTER 7: CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS AND “TOO
BIG TO FAIL,” http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
4. Jeffrey R. Shafer, Five Years Later: Lessons from the Financial Crisis (2013),
http://media.mhfi.com/documents/Five-Years-Later-Paper-by-Jeff-Shafer1.pdf, at 32.
5. Robert J. Rhee, Case Study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch Merger (2010),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=fac_pubs, at
1.
6. Id. at 4.
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policy.7 However, a number of scholars have explained how Dodd-Frank is
a “Flawed and Inadequate Response”8 to TBTF. Consequently, these
scholars have suggested a number of additional steps be taken. In the rest
of this article, we will first review the instruments Dodd-Frank provides to
address TBTF. Then, we will examine the critiques offered showing that
Dodd-Frank does not sufficiently address TBTF. Finally, to see what is
missing in Dodd-Frank, we will review the alternatives suggested by the
existing literature.
DODD-FRANK’S APPROACH TO END “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL”
Dodd-Frank was designed to address a number of the failures that had
led to the 2008 Financial Crisis. One of the express purposes of DoddFrank, according to its preamble, was “to end ‘too big to fail.’”9 In order to
end TBTF, one of Dodd-Frank’s key components is its establishment of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).10 One of its most important
tasks is to identify SIFIs.11 Doff-Frank itself “effectively designates all
commercial banking groups with $50 billion or more in assets as SIFIs.”12
The FSOC can also designate non-banks as SIFIs.
Once designated as a SIFI, such an institution will then “be supervised
more closely and potentially required to operate with greater safety
margins, such as higher levels of capital, and to face further limitations on
their activities.”13 Section 171 of Dodd-Frank (the “Collins Amendment”)14
specifically “imposes, over time, heightened leverage and risk-based capital
standards on systemically important financial institutions. . . and will affect
nonbank financial companies most profoundly because many are currently
not subject to leverage or risk-based capital standards of any kind.”15
Additionally, Dodd-Frank allows the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) “to
apply enhanced supervisory requirements to SIFIs.”16
7. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1 at §I (for more description of Dodd-Frank’s approach to
TBTF).
8. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 963 (2011).
9. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at pmbl.
10. The FSOC is composed of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, and other members.
11. Douglas J. Elliott, Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions That Are Not
Banks, BROOKINGS INST. (2013), at 1, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2013/05/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott/09-regulating-financial-institutions-elliott.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2010).
15. Rob Tammero, Reigning in Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 595, 599 (2011), http://www.bu.edu/rbfl/files/2013/09/ReigningInFinancia
lInstitutions.pdf.
16. Wilmarth, supra note, at 955.
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Another key component of Dodd-Frank is the establishment of the
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). This authority “should provide a
superior alternative to the choice of ‘bailout or bankruptcy’ that federal
regulators confronted when they dealt with failing SIFIs during the
financial crisis.”17 The OLA is “modeled on the FDIC process that
successfully took deposit-taking banks like Washington Mutual that failed
during the crisis into receivership and restructured them without significant
disruption to the broader financial system.”18 To aid in this process, SIFIs
are required to develop “resolution plans” (also known as “living wills”)
that would improve the chances of a rapid dissolution of the institution.19
The idea here is that by “giving the government a credible tool to wind
down large, highly leveraged, and substantially interconnected financial
firms,”20 it should reduce the perceptions that certain financial institutions
are TBTF.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank “drastically limits”21 the ability of the Federal
Reserve and the FDIC to make emergency loans to SIFIs that are failing.
Dodd-Frank “require[s] the Federal Reserve to consult with and receive
approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that any emergency
lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid a
financially failing firm . . . [while] the FDIC is authorized to make shortterm loans to solvent depository institutions subject to Congressional
approval.”22 Loans would be available in liquidation however.23
These components of Dodd-Frank are designed to end TBTF.
Designating institutions as SIFIs, and then regulating them more
extensively including higher capital requirements should reduce the
likelihood that these SIFIs would fail. Meanwhile, creating a better
liquidation process would mean that failure of any one SIFI could be
handled without having the failure spread to other parts of the financial
system. And finally, significantly reducing the opportunities for emergency
lending would mean that SIFIs should realize that the government would
not necessarily be stepping in to alleviate their liquidity problems until after
they “failed,” and so they should have a stronger incentive to prospectively
17. Id.
18. Steven J. Markovich, The Dodd-Frank Act (2013),
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/dodd-frank-act/p28735.
19. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 5325(b)(1)(D). See also BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, RESOLUTION PLANS (2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm.
20. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91,
100 (2012).
21. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1406 n. 229 (2011). See also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1781, 1818-19 (2013).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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manage liquidity so that they would not be in danger of failing. However,
despite these improvements,24 for many reasons, TBTF remains a problem
for the U.S. financial system.
CRITICISMS OF DODD-FRANK’S APPROACH TO TBTF
A number of scholars have criticized Dodd-Frank’s approach to ending
TBTF. Steven Ramirez argues that just as with the Maginot Line in postWorld War I France, Dodd-Frank is designed to fight the battles of the last
war. He argues that while Dodd-Frank “will likely foreclose a subprime
mortgage crisis like the one that nearly crashed global capitalism in the fall
of 2008. . . it will prove unable to prevent a future, more serious debt crisis.
Indeed, it may render such a crisis more likely by transforming implicit
guarantees for megabanks into explicit guarantees.”25 This is because “the
largest American banks continue to benefit from government subsidies
under the too-big-to-fail legal construct that permits banks to privatize gains
and socialize losses.”26
Many have noted that an implied subsidy to SIFIs remains even after
Dodd-Frank.27 An empirical study conducted by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) finds that “SIFIs receive transfers when governments are
forced into bailouts. Ex ante, the bailout expectation lowers daily funding
costs. This funding cost differential reflects both the structural level of the
government support and the time-varying market valuation for such a
support.”28 Moreover, they estimate that this subsidy has actually
“increased” after the crisis.29
24. See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After
a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that while the “Dodd-Frank Act and
the regulations to follow will not end financial crises forever . . . if the regulations are largely well
done, they may postpone the next big crisis and make it both shorter and less severe when it does
occur. Additionally, the Act may do so without imposing too great of a burden on positive
financial innovation and economic growth.” Id. at 6.).
25. Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 109-110
(2011).
26. Id. at 110.
27. See Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank
Subsidy, Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research (Sept. 2009), http://www.cepr.net/documents/public
ations/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf (calculating that the subsidy for large banks was $34 billion a
year. Id. at 2.); Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?,
64 SMU. L. REV. 1243 (2011); and John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank:
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 795, 800 (2011) (noting that “the market may still consider some banks protected, and
hence, the ‘too big to fail’ subsidy would not have been effectively ended.” Id.).
28. Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 1 (Int. Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/128,
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf.
29. Id. However, a different study by Goldman Sachs disputes this finding. See Global
Markets Institute, Measuring the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Effect on Bond Pricing (2013) (unpublished
report), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/measuring-
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Similarly, for a number of reasons, Arthur Wilmarth concludes, “DoddFrank’s provisions fall far short of the changes that would be needed to
prevent future taxpayer-financed bailouts and to remove other public
subsidies for TBTF institutions.”30 One of the reasons that he points to is
that ratings agencies give boosts to TBTF banks. After statements made
before stress tests on nineteen bank holding companies suggested that the
“federal government would provide any capital needed to ensure the
survival of those institutions,”31 both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
gave rating upgrades to the largest of the banks: “Moody’s gave . . . ratings
upgrades for deposits and senior debt issued by the six largest U.S. banks,
based on Moody’s expectation of ‘a very high probability of systemic
support’ for such banks from the U.S. government, . . . [while] S&P, the
other leading CRA, ‘gave Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley ratings upgrades of three notches, four notches, two
notches and three notches, respectively, because of their presumed access to
governmental assistance.’”32 With these ratings boosts, these banks have
access to credit at lower rates, and thus, the expectation that these banks
remain TBTF provides an implicit subsidy to their cost of raising capital.33
Another reason pointed out by Wilmarth is that “Dodd-Frank subjects
SIFIs to consolidated supervision and enhanced prudential standards, but
those provisions are not likely to prevent future bailouts.”34 This is partly
because “Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the concept of stronger capital
requirements, [and] . . . capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the
past.”35 Also, SIFIs “have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to engage
in ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’ in order to weaken the effectiveness of
capital requirements.”36 These reasons are consistent with arguments on the
limitations of capital regulations and prudential standards made by this
author in a previous article on hedge funds: Why we Need a Superfund for
Hedge Funds.37 In that article, I noted, “Specific reserve and margin
requirements would reduce the amount of leverage that a hedge fund can
undertake. However, unless the specific requirements are connected to
levels of liquidity risk, these requirements will not directly address liquidity
risk.”38 Furthermore, prudential standards would likely be an ineffective

tbtf.html.
30. Wilmarth, supra note, at 954.
31. Id. at 983.
32. Id. at 983-4 (quoting Governmental Rescues of “Too-Big-to-Fail” Financial Institutions
12 (2010) (unpublished preliminary staff report) (Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1006.
35. Id. at 1009-10.
36. Id. at 1010.
37. Dale B. Thompson, Why We Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, 79 MISS. L. J. 995
(2010).
38. Id. at 1023.
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control on SIFIs because “it is unlikely that any [command and control]
regulatory system would be able to keep up with the rapidly changing
strategies of”39 the financial sector.
ALTERNATIVES OFFERED IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE
We have seen that Dodd-Frank, while it makes many improvements,
does not fully address the problem of TBTF. So what should we do? Many
have argued that we should use a structural solution. Nobel Laureate
Joseph Stiglitz suggests, “There is an obvious solution to the too-big-to-fail
banks: break them up. If they are too big to fail, they are too big to
exist.”40 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan similarly
concludes, “‘If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big . . . In 1911 we broke
up Standard Oil—what happened? The individual parts became more
valuable than the whole. Maybe that’s what we need to do.’”41 Simon
Johnson and James Kwak suggest that we should put a cap on the size of
SIFIs: banks should be no larger than four percent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), while securities firms should be no larger than two
percent.42 On the other hand, Peter Wallison suggests that careful, costbenefit analysis should be done before considering any break-up, enabling
us to better identify the optimal cap on the size of SIFIs:
Breaking up the biggest banks would obviously have profound
consequences for the US economy, but many who support the idea seem not
to have given any serious thought to whether the benefits of a breakup
exceed the associated costs. Even simpler questions — how small, for
example, a bank would have to be before it is no longer considered TBTF
— have been ignored. It is somewhat shocking that so many people who
should know better have announced their support for the breakup idea
without addressing this and other fundamental questions.43
39.
40.

Id. at 1024.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 164–65 (2010).
41. Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up
Large Banks, BLOOMBERG (October 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
email_en&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg.
42. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 214-15 (2010). ( use of this standard would require the breakup of Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan
Stanley. Id. at 217.); See also Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation,
Financial Innovation, and “Too Big To Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505 (2012) (arguing that “the
simplest and surest way to deal with the oversized institutions that are not only too big to fail, but
also too big and complex to manage, is to impose objective size limits of the sort suggested by
Johnson and Kwak and give management a fixed period of time to come into compliance.” Id. at
551.).
43. Peter J. Wallison, Breaking Up the Big Banks: Is Anybody Thinking?, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INST. (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.aei.org/outlook/economics/financial-services/banking/breaking-up-the-big-banks-isanybody-thinking/.
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Others have suggested changes in corporate governance and finance.
Lawrence Baxter argues that “big banks should bear a greater degree of
public accountability by reforming certain principles of corporate
governance to require greater representation of public interests at the board
and executive levels of big banks.”44 Meanwhile, Nizan Geslevich Packin
suggests using behavioral economics to come up with better rules and
structures for risk committees that are in charge of overseeing the risk
management practices of SIFIs.45 Packin notes that “Traditional economic
tools are not enough to fight the deeply rooted and undesirable culturalinstitutional attitudes and behavioral effects toward excessive risk-taking.”46
And so he instead recommends the use of “behavioral economics-based
guidelines regarding risk committees’ composition, obligation
requirements, and working procedure.”47
Also, Peter Conti-Brown suggests reforming SIFIs’ corporate status to
offer the choice of “elective shareholder liability.”48 If an individual SIFI
did not “change [its] capital structure to include dramatically less debt,”
then the SIFI would be required to “add a bailout exception to their bank’s
limited-shareholder-liability status, thus requiring shareholders - not
taxpayers - to cover the ultimate costs of the bank’s failure.”49
A different approach is through what is known as “contingent capital.”
Contingent capital is a debt instrument that becomes instead an equity
instrument when certain contingencies – such as a financial crisis – occur.
John Coffee argues that contingent capital is the best approach because,
“Properly designed, contingent capital . . . not only can [] prevent the fall of
the first interconnected domino . . ., but it also protects against the danger
that systemically significant financial institutions may face highly
correlated risks.”50 Arthur Wilmarth also suggests using contingent capital
to address TBTF, particularly “if it is used to compensate senior managers
and other key employees.”51 Wulf Kaal likewise notes the advantages from
using contingent capital to “lower their risk taking on behalf of the financial
institution,”52 although he does note some situations where contingent
capital could lead to higher risk-taking.53
44. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large
Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 765
45. Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to
Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419 (2013).
46. Id. at 425-426.
47. Id. at 481.
48. Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 409 (2012).
49. Id.
50. Coffee, supra note 27, at 806.
51. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail
Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 707, 760-61 (2010).
52. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in
Corporate Governance, 26 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’ 281, 297 (2012).
53. Id. at 311 (stating that “SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out.
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The last set of alternative recommendations for addressing TBTF is
through the use of taxes and insurance funds. Overly risky behavior by
financial institutions can generate negative externalities,54 because the costs
of their possible failure may spread to others, as what happened in the 2008
Financial Crisis. In the case of the environment, one approach to deal with
negative externalities is through a Pigouvian tax55 that forces firms to
internalize the negative externality.56 Similarly, a number of scholars have
recommended using a tax to address the negative externalities generated by
financial institutions. In “Why We Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds,”
this author proposed a liquidity tax on hedge funds, based on their portfolio
choices.57 Similarly, Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz note that a tax
based on the systemic risks imposed by a firm can “induce firms to manage
risk with the interests of the financial system in mind [by] causing them to
take into account the systemic importance of their activities.”58
Many have proposed connecting a tax with an “insurance” fund for
taking corrective action. A report issued by the International Monetary
Fund in 2010 suggested imposition of a “‘Financial Stability Contribution’
(FSC) linked to a credible and effective resolution mechanism. The main
component of the FSC would be a levy to pay for the fiscal cost of any
future government support to the sector. . . . The FSC would be . . . refined
thereafter to reflect individual institutions’ riskiness and contributions to
systemic risk.”59 Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller “propose the
creation of a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund . . . [which] should be
funded . . . by risk-adjusted assessments on all large financial firms—
including hedge funds—that benefit from systemic stability.”60 Likewise,
to counteract TBTF subsidies, Arthur Wilmarth argues that the Orderly
Liquidation Fund under Dodd-Frank should be funded by “risk-based
insurance premiums,”61 which would essentially act as a “bank tax.”
A related suggestion comes from Saule Omarova, who “advocates a
If that is the case, SIFI leaders may anticipate a bail-out commitment and may be incentivized to
shift their risk preferences upwards. If the SIFI has issued CCS, decision makers in SIFIs could
shift their risk preferences towards even higher risk profiles.”).
54. A negative externality occurs when a firm’s behavior generates a cost that is not imposed
on itself but is instead imposed on others.
55. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
56. By imposing the tax, the firm must now bear its cost rather than imposing it on others.
This cost is now internalized.
57. See Thompson, supra note 37.
58. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note, at 1402.
59. INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20, at 5 (2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. Note: the “Financial Stability Contribution”
is frequently referred to as a “bank tax.”
60. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.151, 151
(2011).
61. Wilmarth, supra note, at 1020.
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fundamentally new self-regulatory regime in the financial sector, which
would focus explicitly on the issue of systemic risk prevention and impose
the responsibility of protecting the public from financial crises directly on
the financial services industry.”62 This would be done through a
“mandatory system of mutual self-insurance.”63 However, noting several
criticisms of an insurance fund approach,64 including a concern that “a
private insurance fund would be large enough to deal with a true systemic
crisis,”65 John Coffee suggests that “a private bailout fund may be part of
the answer, but it cannot be the entire answer.”66
Thus, the existing literature recommends a wide array of approaches to
address TBTF. Some of these are completely internal to the SIFI firms.
Requiring representation of the “public interest” on SIFI boards and
creating a “public interest” ombudsman as a SIFI executive would mean
that bank decisions that might overly increase liquidity and systemic risks
would face internal scrutiny. This scrutiny would hopefully prevent the
accumulation of risks that could overwhelm the ability of the SIFI’s
reserves to cushion it from external loss shocks. Similar benefits would
flow from properly designed risk committees. These internal controls
would therefore reduce the possibility that a bank would fail, thereby
eliminating the need for a government bailout.
Similar effects arise from the adoption of market instruments calculated
based on liquidity and systemic risks. A tax on systemic risk would provide
an incentive for all SIFI board members and executives – not just those
designated for the “public interest” – to take steps to alleviate excessive
systemic risk. Similar incentives for all board members and executives
result from the adoption of mutual self-insurance, where the industry itself
will impose higher insurance premia on SIFI activities that generate
excessive liquidity and systemic risks. Both of these approaches therefore
create internal incentives to significantly reduce the possibility of failure by
a SIFI.
Meanwhile, breaking up SIFIs and the use of contingent capital would
result in circumstances where, even in the event of the failure of one of
these institutions, no government bailout would be needed. Breaking up
SIFIs would reduce their systemic importance, so that their failure would
have a lower impact on the national economy. This smaller impact would
eliminate the impetus to conduct a government bailout. As a result,
counterparties of these institutions would have new incentives to more
closely monitor the liquidity risks posed by these institutions in their
62. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 413 (2011).
63. Id. at 474.
64. Note that this criticism applies to both the publicly and privately run insurance funds.
65. Coffee, supra note 27, at 801.
66. Id. at 802.
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investment portfolios.
Similarly, widespread use of contingent capital would mean that, in the
event that one of these contingencies were triggered, an internal “private
bailout network” would be formed.
Loan counterparties of the
contingency-triggered SIFI would see their claims on that SIFI converted
into equity. This would mean that the SIFI would no longer be obligated to
raise additional capital to meet its debt payments. Instead, the network of
loan counterparties would become a new network of equity holders in the
SIFI. This private network of equity holders would thereby spread the risks
of the failure of the individual SIFI, enabling the broader financial sector to
absorb the losses without the need for governmental intervention.
Recognizing this future, contingent capital owners would also have
incentives to more closely monitor the liquidity risks of SIFIs.
CONCLUSION
The literature provides a portfolio of options for addressing TBTF that
are all missing from Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank does attempt to address
TBTF through enhanced reserve requirements, by the creation of an Orderly
Liquidation Authority and Fund, and enhanced regulation of both bank and
non-bank SIFIs, as identified by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.
Despite these improvements, there still is an expectation of systemic
support by many, including rating agencies.67 Additionally, implied
subsidies to SIFIs remain due to their continuing status as TBTF.
In the face of the continuing problem of TBTF, scholars have offered a
number of alternatives.
Some, such as increased public interest
representation and the reform of risk committees, attempt to directly change
the internal decision-making of SIFIs to lower their risks. Similarly, a
systemic risk tax provides financial incentives for SIFIs to do this.
Meanwhile, structural alternatives such as breaking SIFIs up should lessen
the need for any government bailout. Also, the greater use of contingent
capital would create a private network for spreading the risk of failure by a
SIFI. Both of these would incentivize counterparties to more closely
monitor the financial institution.
What this review tells us is that Dodd-Frank seems to be missing two
things. One is a mechanism for more significantly reducing the incentives
for SIFIs to take excessive liquidity and systemic risks. The other is a more
credible mechanism for eliminating the need for a government bailout in the
event of the failure of a SIFI. Additional research could use this review to
point the way to a more complete design to fully address TBTF.

67.

Wilmarth, supra note, at 983.

